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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Andrew Maxim contends the district court erred when it held the evidence would have 
been inevitably discovered under an analysis which the Idaho Supreme Court had held, mere 
weeks before, to be improper. The State offered only a brief response to that issue. Its argument 
in that regard makes the precise argument that both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals 
have expressly rejected. Therefore, this Court should reject those arguments, as they would 
render the exclusionary rule, and thus, the Fourth Amendment, meaningless. 
The majority of the State's response tries to find contradictions m the controlling 
precedent, so as to find error in the district court's conclusion that Mr. Maxim had standing to 
procedurally challenge the search of his person in the first place. However, those contradictions 
are born from the State's misreading of the precedent; they do not actually exist. When the 
controlling precedent and legal principles are understood, the State's arguments are meritless. 
The Court of Appeals decision directly on point makes it clear that Mr. Maxim had standing to 
procedurally challenge the search of his person and property even though he had a Fourth 
Amendment waiver a as term of probation. The district court's implicit conclusion, that the 
officers' actions were not justified by the terms of Mr. Maxim's probation because they did not 
know he was on probation at the time of the search, was also in line with the applicable United 
States Supreme Court precedent. As such, this Court should reject the State's attempt to show 
error in those respects. 
1 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated m 
Mr. Maxim's Appellant's Brie£ They need not be repeated m this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
2 
ISSUE 
Whether the district court's speculative analysis under the inevitable discovery doctrine 1s 
directly contrary to clear Idaho Supreme Court precedent. 
3 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court's Speculative Analysis Under The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine Is Directly 
Contrary To Clear Idaho Supreme Court Precedent 
A. A Probation Waiver Of The Fourth Amendment Does Not Give The Officers Carte 
Blanche To Warrantlessly Search A Person, Especially When The Officers Do Not 
Actually Know About The Waiver At The Time Of The Search 
The determination of whether a party has standing to challenge a search is a question 
which "involves only procedural rights." State v. Hanson, 142 Idaho 711, 716 n.2 (Ct. App. 
2006) (citing Minnesota v. Carter, 5235 U.S. 83, 88 (1998)). However, that term is often 
misused to refer to the defendant's ability to show a violation of his, as opposed to another 
person's, Fourth Amendment rights even though that analysis '"is more properly placed within 
the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than within that of standing."' Carter, 525 
U.S. at 88 (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140 (1978)). "[T]his Court's long history of 
insistence that Fourth Amendment rights are personal in nature has already answered many of 
these traditional standing inquiries." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140. In other words, the fact that 
Mr. Maxim sought to ask the district court to determine the constitutionality of a warrantless 
search of his person is sufficient to meet his minimal burden to show standing. See State v. 
Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 162 (2000) (noting the low threshold for the defendant to prove 
standing). 
The State's arguments fail to appreciate this distinction between the procedural and 
substantive analyses in this context, and so, improperly attempts to apply precedents which are 
assessing the substantive constitutionality of a search under the Fourth Amendment to the 
determination of whether the defendant had the procedural ability to challenge that search in the 
first place. Properly understood, the precedent reveals that the district court correctly determined 
4 
Mr. Maxim had standing to challenge the search in this case, and that the warrantless search was 
not reasonable. 
1. Probationers have standing to challenge warrantless searches of their persons and 
property despite Fourth Amendment waivers 
As the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized, society recognizes that 
probationers and parolees have objectively reasonable expectations of privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment; those rights simply are not coextensive with those of normal citizens. Samson v. 
California, 547 U.S. 843, 848-49 & 850 n.2 (2006) (specifically discussing parolees); United 
States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 115 (2001) (specifically discussing probationers). Because they 
still enjoy some protections under the Fourth Amendment, probationers and parolees have the 
procedural ability to challenge warrantless searches even in light of a probation waiver. The 
waiver, in other words, functions as a reason why, substantively, the search was not unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment. 
The Samson Court actually said as much when it explained that the "traditional Fourth 
Amendment analysis of the totality of the circumstances [is] inapplicable to the question whether 
a prisoner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his prison cell." Samson, 547 U.S. at 850 
n.2 ( emphasis added). It also made it clear that its decision in that case was that "the search at 
issue here is reasonable under our general Fourth Amendment approach .... " Id. at 547 U.S. at 
852 n.3 (emphasis added). Thus, it explained that the decision was not based on whether the 
defendant could procedurally challenge the search (i.e. had standing), because if it were actually 
doing so, and holding he had no rights under the Fourth Amendment, "there would have been no 
cause to resort to Fourth Amendment analysis." Id. at 850 n.2. In other words, while "a 
condition of release can so diminish or eliminate a released prisoner's reasonable expectation of 
5 
privacy," it will not always do so. Samson, 547 U.S. 847 (also acknowledging that probationers 
have more expectations of privacy than parolees) (emphasis added). Since the waiver is not a 
per se elimination of the reasonable expectation of privacy, parolees and probationers retain the 
ability to challenge searches into those areas. 
The Supreme Court made a similar point in Knights when it noted: "We do not decide 
whether the probation condition so diminished, or completely eliminated Knights' reasonable 
expectation of privacy ( or constituted consent . . . ) that a search by a law enforcement officer 
without any individualized suspicion would have satisfied the reasonableness requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment." Knights, 534 U.S. at 120 n.6. Thus, the Knights Court was also 
recognizing that the probationer had the procedural ability to challenge the constitutionality of 
the search, but substantively, the search was, in light of the waiver and the reasonable suspicion 
the officers had, was constitutional. Id. 
The Ninth Circuit has actually recognized and succinctly summarized this point: 
"Samson is not itself a case about Fourth Amendment standing, and it does not purport to change 
the requisites for raising a challenge to a substantively invalid search." United States v. 
Grandberry, 730 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, it has held, in no uncertain terms, 
that "there is no question that [the parolee] had standing to challenge the search and seizure of 
his own person," despite the fact that he had a Fourth Amendment wavier as a term of his 
release. Moreno v. Baca, 431 F.3d 633, 641 (9th Cir. 2005). Procedurally, the probationer can 
ask the Court to determine whether the intrusion into the privacy of his person, an intrusion into 
the most "sacred or is more carefully guarded" right, was, substantively, justified by "clear and 
unquestionable authority oflaw." See id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)) (internal 
quotes from Terry omitted). The waiver, in effect, functions as a substantive exception to the 
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warrant requirement (consent) which provides the officers with the clear and unquestionable 
authority to invade on the person's privacy without a warrant. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 121-22 
(reiterating that "the general or individual circumstances, including 'diminished expectations of 
privacy,' may justify an exception to the warrant requirement") ( quoting Illinois v. McArthur, 
531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001 )). 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has, in fact, expressly recognized this precise point. See 
State v. Cruz, 144 Idaho 906, 907 & 908 (Ct. App. 2007). In that case, the Court held that the 
defendant "had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his girlfriend's apartment which he 
frequented regularly, either as a social guest or 'part-time' resident, and that he was therefore 
entitled to challenge the reasonableness of the search" despite the fact that, as a term of his 
parole, he had agreed to "submit to a search of person or property, to include residence and 
vehicle, at any time and place by any agent of Field and Community Services and [he] does 
waive constitutional right to be free from such searches."1 State v. Cruz, 144 Idaho 906, 907 & 
908 (Ct. App. 2007) (emphasis added). The evidence in this case shows that Mr. Maxim was in 
nearly the same situation as the defendant in Cruz - he was at his girlfriend's house, which he 
frequented either as a guest or part-time resident. 2 (See Tr., p.7, Ls.11-23; Defense Exhibit 1, 
1 Cruz ultimately held that "Cruz's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated because the 
government's substantial interest in supervising parolees outweighs Cruz's significantly 
diminished expectation of privacy in his girlfriend's apartment." Cruz, 144 Idaho at 910. That 
decision, like the decision in Samson, was based on the substantive application of the Fourth 
Amendment analysis, not, as Cruz expressly noted, on a determination that the defendant could 
not procedurally challenge the search in the first place. See id. at 908 
2 In finding Mr. Maxim had standing, the district court noted that one of the purposes of the 
exclusionary rule, which is what Mr. Maxim sought to invoke, was to address misconduct by the 
officers. (Tr., p.26, L.19 - p.27, L.9.) That assertion was consistent with the rationale behind the 
standing requirement - that a person who shows that their privacy has been invaded should have 
the procedural ability to seek a remedy for that injury. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139-40 
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~1:17:45.) Therefore, because the officers invaded his privacy by entering the apartment and 
searching his person, he, like the defendants in Cruz and Moreno, had standing, the procedural 
ability to challenge the lawfulness of those actions, despite the fact that the terms of his 
probation contained a Fourth Amendment waiver. The State's arguments to the contrary, based 
on its misunderstanding of Samson and its progeny, are meritless. 
2. The officers' actions were not objectively reasonable, and so, the warrantless 
searches were unlawful 
As noted supra, the question which the State is actually attempting to raise is whether, 
substantively, the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. As the United States 
Supreme Court has pointed out, "almost without exception in evaluating alleged violations of the 
Fourth Amendment the Court has first undertaken an objective assessment of an officer's actions 
in light of the facts and circumstances then known to him." Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 
137 (1978). As such, it was proper for the district court to consider whether the officers knew 
( explaining that the issue of standing involves two questions - whether there was an injury-in-
fact, and whether the proponent is asserting his own legal rights). 
However, to the extent the State was correct, and the district court improperly considered 
the purpose of the exclusionary rule in deciding whether Mr. Maxim had standing (Resp. 
Br., p.16), that does not make the determination that Mr. Maxim actually had standing wrong, 
since, as discussed supra, he had standing for the same reason the defendant in Cruz did. 
Moreover, that was a proper consideration in regard to the issue on which the district court 
ultimately focused on in its written order - whether the exclusionary rule should apply to 
Mr. Maxim's case. (See R., pp.65-70.) Therefore, if there was error in that regard, it does not 
create a valid alternative reason to affirm the order denying the motion to suppress. Compare 
State v. Godwin, 164 Idaho 903, _, 436 P.3d 1252, 1271 (2019) (noting that the district court 
had corrected any possible error in its oral statement when it issued its written order, which 
correctly addressed the issue). 
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about the probation waiver at the time of the search as part of its assessment of whether the 
search was unreasonable. 3 
Based on its misunderstanding of Samson, the State contends that the courts do not 
actually follow this rule because they routinely consider factors the officers could not have 
known at the time of the search. (Resp. Br., pp.13-15.) The point which the State failed to 
appreciate in that regard is that the cases were genuinely dealing with the question of standing -
whether the defendant had the procedural ability to raise a Fourth Amendment argument. 
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717-18 (1987) (holding that the defendant could procedurally 
challenge the search of his desk in in his public workplace); State v. Mann, 162 Idaho 36, 42 
(2017) (holding the defendant could not procedurally bring a challenge to the search of a rental 
car when he was not an authorized driver on the rental agreement), overruled by Byrd v. United 
States, _ U.S. _, 138 S. Ct. 1518 (2018) (holding that person could procedurally bring that 
challenge); United States v. Wong, 334 F.3d 831, 839 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding a defendant could 
not procedurally challenge the search of a laptop, conducted pursuant to a warrant, since the 
laptop belonged to his employer); State v. Vasquez, 129 Idaho 129, 131 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding 
the defendant could not procedurally challenge the search of an apartment in which he was a 
brief visitor, rather than owner, renter, or overnight guest, concluding he could not). 
3 As discussed in note 2, supra, to the extent the State is correct, and the district court erred by 
including a discussion of the officers' knowledge in its oral ruling on standing (Resp. Br., pp.13-
14), that does not actually make its conclusion that Mr. Maxim had standing wrong. Therefore, 
it is not a valid alternative reason to affirm the order denying the motion to suppress. 
Moreover, since this was actually a proper consideration within the substantive analysis 
of the merits of the motion, that comment actually helps demonstrate why the district court 
focused on the exclusionary rule in its ultimate written order - it implicitly found the search was 
not lawful. Compare Godwin, 436 P.3d at 1271 (noting that the district court had corrected any 




In Samson and its progeny, the defendant could procedurally challenge the search and the
courts were (as discussed supra) evaluating whether, substantively, the search actually violated
the protections of the Fourth Amendment.  That means those courts were evaluating whether the
officers’ actions were objectively reasonable. See Scott,  436  U.S.  at  137.   Thus,  the  State  has
crossed the streams, and, as a result, is seeing a contradiction in the precedent that does not
actually exist.
In fact, Samson itself  belies  the  State’s  point  in  this  regard. Samson specifically noted
that “an officer would not act reasonably in conducting a suspicionless search absent knowledge
that the person stopped for the search is a parolee,” as the law prohibits parole searches from
being “arbitrary, capricious, or harassing” searches. Samson, 547 U.S. at 856 & n.5 (specifically
discussing  this  principle  in  terms  of  the  California  law  at  issue  in  that  case); see, e.g., United
States v. Caseres, 533 F.3d 1064, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Samson for this overarching
legal principle); State v. Donaldson, 108 A.3d 500, 504-05 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015) (same, and
noting that Samson had favorably cited the portion of People v. Sanders, 73 P.3d 496, 505-06
(Cal. 2003), where the California Supreme Court had discussed that same principle).
Caseres, Donaldson, and Sanders are not the only other courts to recognize and reaffirm
this principle. See, e.g., United States v. Job, 871 F.3d 852, 859-60 (9th Cir. 2017); Moreno, 431
F.3d at 641; United States v. Gibson, 254 F.Supp.3d 982, 988-89 (E.D. Tenn. 2017); United
States v. Williams, 702 F.Supp.2d 1021, 1030-31 (N.D. Ill. 2010). See also State v. Brusuelas,
219 P.3d 1, 5 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009) (noting that, had the officer’s lack of knowledge about the
term of probation actually been raised below, it would likely have been dispositive for the
reasons  set  forth  in  the  dissenting  opinion  (id. at 9-10)); Fenton v. State, 154 P.3d 974, 981
(Wyo. 2007) (noting that, for a search to be justified by the terms of parole, the officer “must be
able to point to specific and articulable facts that, taken together with rational inference from 
those facts, reasonably warrant a belief that a condition of parole has been or is being violated") 
(emphasis added) (internal quote and alterations omitted); State v. Barnett, 790 S.W.2d 662, 663-
64 (Tex. App. 1990) (affirming the district court's decision to suppress evidence because none of 
the officers testified to knowing that the defendant was on probation, and so, making a credibility 
determination that the probation waiver was being offered as an uncredible, after-the-fact 
justification); cf State v. Albertson,_ P.3d _, 2019 WL 1397277, *6 n.8 (Mar. 28, 2019) ("We 
note that, although the test is an objective one, if an officer is actually aware that a person has 
acted to revoke the implied license, he would not be free to approach the home.") ( emphasis 
added), petition for rev. pending.4 
In fact, this rule - that the officers had to know about the term of probation for that term 
to justify the search - is reflected in the cases involving probation waivers to which the State 
cited to try to support its argument. (See Resp. Br., pp.10-11.) The Court in every one of those 
cases took time to expressly note the fact that the officers conducting the searches in those case 
were aware that the defendant was on probation or parole and the search was actually conducted 
under the authority of those terms. Samson, 547 U.S. at 846-47 ("Officer Rohleder was aware 
that petitioner was on parole" and "based solely on petitioner's status as a parolee, Officer 
Rohleder searched petitioner"); State v. Purdam, 14 7 Idaho 206, 206 (2009) ("[A] police officer 
4 In addition to those published decisions, several other courts have applied the same rule in 
unpublished decisions. Muse v. Harper, No. 2:07-cv-723, 2017 WL 3633746, *5 (M.D. Tenn. 
2017); New v. Perry, No. 3:15-cv-615, 2009 WL 483341, *9 (S.D. Ohio 2009); Curtis v. 
Commonwealth, 2016 WL 6311218, *5 (Ky. Ct. App. 2016). These cases are not offered as 
controlling precedent, but rather simply as additional examples of how learned courts have 
approached this issue. See Staff of Idaho Real Estate Comm 'n v. Nordling, 135 Idaho 630, 634 
(2001) (quoting Bourgeois v. Murphy, 119 Idaho 611, 617 (1991)). 
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who knew of Purdam's probation conditions [to submit to random drug tests] ... decided to stop 
him for a drug test."); State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho 841, 842 (1987) ("Housley [a Senior Probation 
and Parole officer] confirmed that Gawron was then on probation" and had a Fourth Amendment 
wavier as a term of that probation, and that Probation Officer Housley, himself, conducted the 
search of Gawron's residence); State v. Spencer, 139 Idaho 736, 737 (Ct. App. 2004) ("Conklin's 
probation officer, along with two police officers, went to Conklin's house to perform a 
probationary search," where they found the defendant in a locked bedroom, which they searched 
because "that all areas of the residence were subject to search pursuant to Conklin's probation"). 
Thus, the district court properly considered the fact that the officers did not know about 
the term of probation at the time they acted in its apparent determination that the search was not 
lawful under the Fourth Amendment. (See Tr., p.26, L.19 - p.27, L.9; R., pp.65-70.) The State's 
arguments to the contrary, which are based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the relevant 
legal principles, should be rejected. 
B. Based On Recent Idaho Supreme Court Precedent, Which The State Does Not So Much 
As Mention, The Totality Of The Circumstances In This Case Do No Justify The Frisk 
Because They Do Not Show Mr. Maxim Presented An Actual Danger 
The Idaho Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that "Terry and its progeny require more 
than general unease or confusion" to show there was an actual danger to justify a frisk for 
weapons. State v. Downing, 163 Idaho 26, 30 (2017). That is because a "general unease" would 
simply be an inchoate suspicion or mere hunch. See State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 (2009). 
As a result of those principles, the Downing Court held that the frisk was not justified 
because, even though the suspects had admitted to using methamphetamine and there was some 
confusion at the scene, some of which was actually caused by the defendant's erratic behavior, 
there was no bulge in the defendant's clothing, his hands were secured in handcuffs, and he was 
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calmed down by the time the officer conducted the frisk. Downing, 163 Idaho at 30. Likewise, 
in Bishop, the Supreme Court held that there was no actual risk even though the officer was 
acting on a tip from known informants that the defendant had drugs, and Bishop actually 
appeared to be under the influence of a narcotic, initially refused to consent to the frisk, was 
acting nervous, was clutching a bag to his chest, and said he was on probation, because nothing 
about the way in which he made those actions indicated he presented an actual risk of danger. 
Bishop, 146 Idaho at 809 (also noting that, despite being initially cooperative, the defendant 
interrupted the frisk by turning around and telling the officer "no" again, and struggled when the 
officers tried to handcuff him). 
The State does not cite Downing at all in its brief, and it only mentions Bishop for the 
overarching standard. (See generally Resp. Br.) Instead, it relies solely on the Court of Appeals 
decision in State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 554 (Ct. App. 1999). That is troubling because the 
analysis in Bishop and Downing appears to contradict, if not wholly abrogate, the analysis in 
Fleenor. Compare State v. Islas, _ P.3d _, 2019 WL 1053379, *4 n.1 (Ct. App. 2019) 
(criticizing the State's reliance on old precedent without acknowledging more recent Supreme 
Court precedent on point). 
In Fleenor, officers were conducting a probation search on a third party's house. State v. 
Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 553-54 (Ct. App. 1999). They saw Fleenor, who was not the 
probationer, standing near the kitchen, and saw that he had a knife sheath on his belt. Id. The 
officer wanted to take the knife apparently inside the sheath for safety purposes, 5 and Fleenor 
became "very uncooperative." Id. Unfortunately, the opinion does not describe what Fleenor 
5 The opinion is not clear whether the officer could see the knife itself, or just the sheath. See 
generally Fleenor, 133 Idaho at 553-54. 
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actually did that was "very uncooperative" except that he tried to walk away from the officer. 
See id. 
However, Bishop has subsequently reiterated that a person may peacefully refuse to 
consent to a frisk. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 817-18; compare Fleenor, 133 Idaho at 553-54 (noting 
the defendant was not the one on probation, which would suggest he was not the one subject to 
the search provisions). As such, the refusal to cooperate with a frisk, by itself, is not sufficient to 
justify a frisk. See Bishop, 146 Idaho at 820-21 (finding a frisk was not justified even though the 
defendant had initially refused to consent to the frisk, and during the frisk, he had stopped being 
cooperative to the point that the officers placed him under arrest for obstruction). Moreover, 
Downing held that the general unease or confusion in the officer's initial interactions with the 
people when he arrived on the scene was not sufficient to justify a frisk. Downing, 163 Idaho at 
30. Thus, the only articulated basis for the decision is Fleenor - the fact that the defendant did 
not cooperate with the frisk and tried to walk away during the initial stages of the encounter -
would not be sufficient to justify the frisk under Bishop and Downing. As such, the State's 
reliance on Fleenor, particularly without discussing Bishop or Downing, is improper. 
Moreover, applying the analysis from Bishop and Downing to this case reveals that the 
frisk was not justified. The encounter happened during the day, while it was still light out. 
Compare Bishop, 146 Idaho at 821. There was no indication that Mr. Maxim appeared to be 
under the influence of drugs. Compare Bishop, 146 Idaho at 809; State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 
655, 661 (2007)6; see also Downing, 163 Idaho at 30 (the suspects admitting to have smoked 
6 As the State noted, (Resp. Br., pp.19-20) there are some factors that were present in Henage 
which were not present in Mr. Maxim's case. (Resp. Br., pp.19-20.) There are, however, several 
factors which were the same - that the encounter occurred during daylight hours, that the 
defendant admitted having a knife, not appearing to be under the influence - and which, as 
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methamphetamine recently). There was no indication that there were susp1c1ous bulges in 
Mr. Maxim's clothing. Compare Bishop, 146 Idaho at 821. Mr. Maxim's statements during that 
time were calm, and actually provided the officer with information relevant to what he was 
doing. Compare Bishop, 146 Idaho at 820 ("Neither the substance nor the manner in which the 
statements were made suggest that [he] posed a threat."). 
And while Mr. Maxim did admit to having a knife and reached toward his pockets, there 
was nothing "furtive" about those movements, nor did it appear that he was trying to reach inside 
his pockets, as opposed to just patting the exterior to recall what was there. (See Defense Exhibit 
A, ~2:10.) Moreover, when the officer instructed him to put his hands on his head instead, 
Mr. Maxim complied. Compare Bishop, 146 Idaho at 821 (noting there was no issue because the 
defendant stood in such a manner that his hands remained visible to the officer and was 
somewhat compliant with the officer's instructions). Thus, any risk that might have been 
apparent from the fact that Mr. Maxim felt at his pockets was not enough to outweigh all the 
other factors which showed those actions were not aggressive or threating, such as to justify the 
frisk. Compare State v. Tyler, 153 Idaho 623, 628 (Ct. App. 2012) (affirming the district court's 
conclusion that a frisk was not justified even though the defendant had, on three different 
occasions, and despite the officer's repeated instructions, reached toward the pocket in which he 
admitted he had a knife). 
Likewise, the fact that Mr. Maxim had initially tried to hide in the bathroom was not 
sufficient to justify the frisk, particularly in light of all those subsequent factors. Compare 
discussed infra, demonstrated neither person presented an actual danger. Henage's continuing 
applicability is also demonstrated by the fact that Bishop specifically relies on Henage, while 
none of the Supreme Court's recent decisions rely on Fleenor. See Bishop, 146 Idaho at 818-20; 
see generally, e.g., Downing, 163 Idaho 26; Bishop, 146 Idaho 804; Henage, 143 Idaho 655. 
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Downing, 163 Idaho at 28 & 30 (holding the frisk was not justified even though the defendant
had initially tried to hide behind the couch).  Officer Ludwig’s actions after Mr. Maxim put his
hands on his head further objectively demonstrate that he did not harbor immediately concerns
about his safety – he did not immediately secure the knife, nor did he further restrain Mr. Maxim.
(See Defense Exhibit A, ~2:15.)  Instead, he let Mr. Maxim walk toward the front door because
the officer wanted more room to maneuver.  (See Defense Exhibit A, ~2:15.)  Even couched in
the most negative light – that Mr. Maxim was trying to walk away from the officer – that would
not necessarily justify the frisk. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 821 (holding the defendant’s refusal to
consent to, or fully cooperate with, the frisk did not justify the frisk in light of all the other
circumstances).  At any rate, the officer’s reason for letting Mr. Maxim walk down the hallway
does not change the objective impact of that fact because, “[t]he fact that the officer may have
had a subjective feeling that his safety was compromised was irrelevant under the objective
totality of the circumstances analysis.” Bishop, 146 Idaho at 819.  Rather, his behavior –
allowing Mr. Maxim to keep the knife during that time and still move about without further
restraints – objectively demonstrates Mr. Maxim did not objectively present an actual danger,
and so, the frisk was not justified. Compare Downing, 163 Idaho at 30 (noting the risk was
reduced because the defendant was restrained at the time of the search); Henage, 143 Idaho at
662 (noting the fact that the officer returned the knife to Henage objectively demonstrated there
was no concern that he presented an actual danger during the encounter).
As such, applying the actual controlling precedent, it is apparent from the totality of the
circumstances that Mr. Maxim did not present an actual danger.  That means the frisk was
unjustified.  The State’s arguments to the contrary, based solely on an apparently-abrogated case,
should be rejected.
C. The State's Argument As To Inevitable Discovery Rely Entirely On The Same 
Speculative Analysis About What Officer Ludwig Might Have Done, Had He Not 
Actually Violated Mr. Maxim's Constitutional Rights 
As noted supra, the State did not mention Downing, which is troubling since Downing 
represents the Idaho Supreme Court's most recent discussion of how the inevitable discovery 
doctrine works. Worse yet, the State proceeds to make the precise argument that Downing held 
to be improper - that, had Officer Ludwig had not frisked Mr. Maxim without valid 
justification, 7 he would have asked for additional information, run it through dispatch, and found 
the warrant. (Resp. Br., pp.20-23) The Court of Appeals has actually rejected this precise 
argument - "if the police had not searched illegally, but instead had done whatever was 
necessary to make the search legal (e.g., obtain a warrant or secure additional information to 
establish reasonable cause), the evidence in question would have been obtained" - specifically 
because it would render the warrant requirement embodied in the Fourth Amendment dead letter. 
State v. Cook, 106 Idaho 209, 225-26 (Ct. App. 1984) (Burnet, J., with whom Walters, C.J., 
joined, specially concurring) (internal quotation omitted, capitalization altered) ( emphasis 
added). Thus, the State is simply asking this Court to substitute what the officer should have 
done for what he actually did, which Downing and Cook have clearly held is improper. 
Here, as in Downing and Cook, the error which actually occurred tainted all the 
information subsequently gathered in that line of investigation, and there was no other untainted 
line of investigation which was already going to lead the officers to that same information. 
7 The State actually notes that there were several other aspects of the officer's actions which 
were potential bases to suppress the evidence - that the officer may have exceeded the scope of a 
permissible pat down by manipulating the items in Mr. Maxim's pocket or by opening the 
container he found in Mr. Maxim's pocket - but it accurately noted that those issues had not 
been raised by trial counsel below. (Resp. Br., p.8 n.1.) To be clear, Mr. Maxim reserves his 
right to raise those issues in post-conviction, if it becomes necessary. 
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Therefore, the inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply, because if it did, it would swallow 
the exclusionary rule. Therefore, for the reasons set forth in the Appellant's Brief, this Court 
should reject the State's arguments and reverse the order denying the motion to suppress on that 
basis. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Maxim respectfully requests this Court reverse the district court's order denying his 
motion to suppress under the inevitable discovery doctrine. 
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